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Abstract. We  analyzed how information in the financial press influences investment 
decisions and the specific case of economic bubbles. We found considerable flaws in the 
information market due to several factors: demand, the predominance of what are termed 
“irrational investors” (herding), and supply, which has the problem that the sources of 
information are biased and feeds back. A financial bubble is a deviation between real value of 
a financial asset and its persistent market price in time, which also has a speculative origin 
fed back by the illusion of the owners of these financial values, who will take benefits because 
of the future prices, which must be higher than the previous ones. In this context, the 
economical information in the media is submitting three problems. First of all, it is information 
generated by companies. In second place, the information circuit is fed back. A problem of 
informative independence becomes created, particularly serious in the case of the banks, 
which are at the same time  creditors. And in a third place, some informative biases are 
manifested for the companies of regulated sectors which are starring the economical 
information in the media. 
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Resumen. El artículo trata como la información en la prensa económica inluencia las 
decisiones de inversión y del caso específico de las burbujas financieras. Econtramos 
considerables fallos en el mercado de la información causados por diversos factores: una 
demanda en la que predomina la denominada inversión irracional (herding) y una oferta en la 
que las fuentes de información estan sesgadas y se retroalimentan.Una burbuja financiera es 





una desviación entre el valor real de un activo financiero y su cotización bursátil que tiene un 
origen especulativo retroalimentado por la ilusión de los propietarios de dichos activos 
financieros de obtener beneficios esperando que los precios futuros serán mayores a los 
presentes. En este contexto, la información económica en los medios de comunicación 
presenta tres problemas.La primera és que la información la generan las propias sociedades. 
En segundo lugar, el circuito de la información se retroalimenta. Se crea un problema de 
independencia de la información que resulta particularmente grave en el caso de los bancos 
que son al mismo tiempo acreedores de las sociedades. Y en tercer lugar algunos sesgos 
informativos corresponden a empresas de sectores regulados que manifiestan una tendencia 
a protagonizar la información económica en los medios. 
 
An interdisciplinary problem  
 
The influence of financial information in the media has been analyzed 
by different disciplines, such as communication, sociology, economics and 
politics.  
As economic bubbles are imbalances in the market, the basic 
approaches to them can be divided into those who consider that the market  
is working properly and bubbles are just temporary imbalances, and those 
who believe that these imbalances are structural and highlight weaknesses in 
the way that markets operate. In the analysis of bubbles, Markus 
Brunnermeier is the most  remarkable economist who accepts the hypothesis 
of rationality and efficient markets. He is notable for his attempt to  build a 
complete theoretical model on the occurrence of bubbles. According to 
Brunnermeier, stock brokers are fully aware that certain situations are 
characteristic of a bubble with a predictable conclusion, but opinion varies as 
to when the bubble will burst. Therefore, for Brunnermeier, the theoretical 
problem is to determine the optimum behaviour of agents in this environment.  
The cause of bubbles is not addressed in Brunnermeier’s model, but at 
least he accepts that they exist. Likewise, he does not consider the possible 
influence of the financial press on economic bubbles.  
The hypothesis of the rationality of the stock market agents in 
Brunnermeier’s model implies that the market is predictable. This issue has 
been the subject of debate and controversy in recent years, with the 
emergence of “behavioural economics” that rejects the hypothesis of rational 
agents in financial markets.  
 






One of the notable exponents of this approach is Andrei Shleifer, who 
constructed a complete alternative model on the occurrence of bubbles. In 
general, this approach has focused closely on the factors that influence the 
general opinion forming. Andrei Shleifer himself and Sendhil Mullainathan 
(2004) theorized on the influence of the press in general, rather than the 
financial press, and considered it as a news market. 
Brad Barber and Odean Terrance1 directly found relationships between 
the influence of both the press and investors. They considered that investors 
make decisions on the shares of companies that are familiar to them. This 
familiarity is closely linked to the press.  
An analysis made by Paul R. Milgrom (1981) also helps us to 
understand the effects of press influence on investment decisions. He 
assessed the impact of good and bad news on share prices, from the 
perspective of information economics.  
Milgrom took a variable that represented ‘quality’ or ‘intrinsic value’ in a 
rational expectation or adverse selection model and formulated the 
relationships of more or less favorable for two pieces of news (signals).  
According to P. Milgrom, one application of his basic model deals 
directly with the impact of news on a company’s stock market value. He states 
that favorable news about profit expectations leads to a rise in share price. 
Another application that Milgrom describes is the ‘games of persuasion’ 
in which, for example, a regulated company tries to influence the regulator by 
selectively providing information that is relevant to a decision. In one version 
of the model, at equilibrium, the company provides the most favorable 
information and withholds the least favorable. If the communication between 
the parties  has no cost and the regulator detects that information is being 
withheld, then this will adopt a strategy of extreme skepticism. Thus, this will 
assume that the company is withholding the most unfavorable information. 
The company’s expected response will be to adopt a strategy of full 
disclosure.  
In subsequent papers, Milgrom (2008) returns to the subject of 
persuasion with a study that contains less mathematical formulas. He 
describes a more complex reality and revises the applications that refer to 
“games of persuasion”. Good news on the stock market could focus, for 
                                                
1 See Barber and Odean (2007). These authors have published previous papers on this subject. 





example, on the development of new technology for a company. The issue 
that is discussed is how the “game of persuasion” develops in terms of 
information between the company manager and the potential investor.  
Of course, it is not always possible to transmit information. An investor 
may not have the ability to assess and analyze in depth the information that is 
provided. In this case, reputation comes into play. Accounting companies, 
auditors, investment banks, professional offices, etc. depend on their 
reputation, as this is the signal  used as indicator for their evaluation.  
Another consideration is that the value of a piece of information may 
emerge once the event has passed. For example, a strike is an eventuality, 
but if one occurs we could consider that not enough information was provided 
about the problem. Therefore, companies have to assess which information 
they release. 
We should also consider that competition within sectors affects 
information. For example, a monopoly is situated in a privileged position to 
provide only the information that   is more convenient for this company to 
release.  
Companies’ communication activities can be explained in terms of a 
communication strategy. In relation to information, companies have 
traditionally feared the competition and the tax office above all, and they aim 
to build a reputation in the eyes of their stakeholders.  
Reputation can be defined as the stakeholders’ evaluation of an 
organization. Thus, the reason for a reputation should be sought in the 
stakeholders’ experiences of a company’s daily operations, its brand, 
marketing and public image. This information may come from the media or 
through word of mouth.  
The stakeholder theory states that corporations must act for the benefit 
of all “interested parties” – not just the shareholders. Company’s stakeholders 
or interest groups include any individual or group who could influence or is 
influenced by company practices. Stakeholders could be suppliers, 
consumers, employees, shareholders, financial institutions, the government 
and the media. 
As David L. Deephouse (2000) and other authors2 have stated, 
reputation can give to a company a competitive advantage. For example, it 
                                                
2 Helm, Macmillan, Srivastava, Crosby, McInish, Wood and Capraro (2000). 






can help to acquire more clients, improve bank interests, increase share 
price, etc. Companies increasingly try to manage this intangible asset through 
corporate communications departments. 
This conclusion is confirmed in various papers  from the business 
communication strategy scope. An important study is that one made by David 
Deephouse in which he presents a company’s reputation as a strategy that 
incorporates mass communication theory and business administration. 
Deephouse considers that reputation is  a way to achieve a competitive 
strategy. His study focused on commercial banks, in which he found that 
reputation had a positive influence on performance.  
David Deephouse takes as a starting point communication research on 
aspects  like audiences, media organizations and the resulting effects on 
audiences. In this field, it has been shown that the media gather public 
information on companies and influence the public opinion of these 
corporations. The media not only act as vehicles for transmitting information, 
but also as active agents of information and opinion forming.  
Many journalists have questioned this conclusion, but the codes of 
ethics have been drawn up with this potential influence in mind.  
The assumption that the media influence knowledge and opinion 
applies to reputation as media coverage is a reasonable indicator of 
knowledge and opinion about companies in a specific period.  
The information that appears in the media comes from various sources, 
but above all from the company itself, in a theoretical framework defined by 
asymmetric information. In general, reputation facilitates the creation of value, 
as it is a positive sign for clients, shareholders, employees, workers, suppliers 
and researchers, among others. The strategic benefits are as follows: firstly, 
the possibility of reducing costs (loans, suppliers, etc.); secondly, the 
opportunity to establish higher prices; and, finally, the option of creating 
competitive barriers. In short, the aim of the communication strategy is to 
improve the business performance.  
R. Vergin and M. Qoronfleh (1998) analyzed the relationship between 
business returns and reputation according to data in Fortune magazine. They 
found a positive relationship between the reputation index and the 
performance on the stock market. During over fourteen years they examined 
the companies in the first ten places of the Fortune ranking. They found that 
the year after a company appeared in the ranking, its stock market value rose 





by as much as 20.1 per cent. The average increase on the S&P stock market 
index was 13.1 per cent. Of course, this increase in value means that shares 
are more expensive. Investors who buy expensive shares could find that the 
returns on each dividend decrease due to the company results.  
In the same line, Thomas Schuster (2003) verified the positive effect 
that information in the financial press can have on quotations. This can lead to 
an increase in share price and a reduction in returns. He also indicated that 
pressure on prices comes from new and inexperienced investors. 
In particular, communication with shareholders is a specialized task 
that is carried out by Investor Relations. Investor Relations (IR)3 is a term that 
describes the office or department in a company that deals with shareholders. 
The tasks of IR include aspects of communication as well as finance, law and 
commerce. 
This specialization was first introduced in the USA in the 1960s. It 
became widespread from the 1970s to the 1990s as a result of the growth in 
institutional funds, which are the main aim of communication in IR. The 
traditional role of IR professionals is to ensure that the prices of a company’s 
shares are seen in a favorable light. 
IR departments also devote much of their work to the media, as the 
perception of a company is due, to a great extent, to its image in the financial 
press.  
Aeron Davis (2006) observed and analyzed the relations between the 
IR and investors, from a sociological perspective of the media. To attain this 
objective, he examined the changing influence of London Stock Exchange 
news reported by the media. He also interviewed over one hundred people in 
the three subgroups of people who are most affected by this subject: 
company managers in charge of investor relations (IR), financial journalists 
and professional investors.  
The journalists who were interviewed have quite limited access to 
companies’ chief executives and financial directors. In fact, companies 
present reports to financial analysts and fund managers before they release 
them to the media. Some companies prefer individual contact with the press 
to public presentations. In any case, companies follow financial information 
closely.  
                                                
3 See Inoue, 2009. 






The media are also in contact with financial analysts and fund 
managers. The interviewees recognized that the media are very important for 
safeguarding a company’s reputation. Although the key factor for investment 
decisions is considered the opinion of senior managers, a company’s media 
image reflects general expectations and can sometimes help to trigger a 
decision.  
The most important communication task is considered the management 
of bad news in times of crisis since such news  could have a very negative 
impact on a company. 
Companies, particularly large ones, are believed to have a 
considerable capacity to affect the financial press. It can be very difficult for 
small companies to gain coverage in the financial media. 
There is extensive news coverage in situations of crisis, so that 
companies have to try to be treated positively by regional media.  
In financial information, journalists clearly consider that the largest 
companies and/or those with the greatest investment potential are the most 
“noticeable” to their readers.  
The excessive influence of business sources in the news is often 
criticized: “The national financial press  is written for the city by the city”. This 
is attributed to the dependence of the press on advertising.  
The fund managers who were interviewed believed that the financial 
press had only a limited influence on investment decisions. In comparison to 
journalists, fund managers have more access to chief executives. They are 
also in a better position to analyze companies. One of the difficulties faced by 
journalists is insufficient financial training to analyze companies. 
The press continues to have an important influence, as it is the only 
source of information for many small shareholders. The media coverage of 
small and medium sized companies also has a considerable impact, as 
analysts may have little information about such enterprises.  
In accordance with Davis, the overall importance of the financial media 
has decreased in terms of its impact on quotations and its influence on 
investment decisions. Nevertheless, financial media continue to be treated 
with caution by companies and are closely followed by the investment 
community as they can occasionally have a considerable impact on 
investment patterns.  





Analysts are frequently associated with financial institutions. 
Consequently, their analysis may be affected by their institution’s interests in 
the companies under examination. 
Robert Shiller (2000) is the economist who has addressed the 
relationship between economic bubbles and the financial press in the most 
direct, global way. Shiller analyzed the impact of the financial media on the 
stock markets in various stages and in different countries. He interviewed 
investors and concluded that the financial media did not generally have an 
influence on the immediate decision of the investors, in the sense that no rule 
could be deduced. 
Nevertheless, Shiller considered that the media participate actively in 
the formation of public opinion and in different categories of thought. In 
addition, the media create the environment in which market events take place. 
He also illustrated with examples the fact that the media, who have to 
provide topics of interest to the public, are essential propagators of 
speculative movements in share prices. Shiller considers that the concept of 
feedback that occurs in speculative bubbles is fundamental, and that the 
media play an essential role in this area.  
The analysis of the relationship between journalism and power has also 
looked at the influence of the press on society, which has a particular effect 
on investors. The work of Noam Chomsky is particularly notable in this area. 
In conjunction with Edward Herman, Chomsky developed the Propaganda 
Model (PM)4 for international information, which has been applied in the field 
of finance5.  
The basic proposition of PM is that news systematically favors the state 
elite and corporate interests through the action of five structural filters: 
ownership, advertising, the dependence of information sources, the threat of 
lawsuits and ideological conformity (anti-communism, anti-terrorism, etc.).  
In Herman and Chomsky’s model (1988), the media are considered a 
structural component of a nexus with the power elite, as they share an 
interest in perpetuating the social conditions that are most  to the 
accumulation of capital, regardless of whether this objective is compatible 
with social justice or the democratic process.  
                                                
4 Year 1988. 
5 See Thomson (2009). 






According to Thomson (2009), when this model is applied to the field of 
financial information, the following aspects need to be considered and 
resolved: 
1.  The complexity of the alliance between the media and the state elite.  
2.  A consideration of how filtering occurs, as there are many real-time events 
on the stock market. 
3.  The relationships between journalists and information sources for events 
that, due to their nature, can only be understood by experts. One example 
is the value of derivatives. 
4. The media are designed for different audiences. For example, the 
specialized financial press is not accessible to the general public. 
5.  Global financial markets and modern communication systems. 
In terms of the relationship between the media and the elite, we should 
note that the main international media groups continue  being family 
businesses. Hence, their individual interests are necessarily limited. 
Furthermore, if the vector “shareholder” is extended to include financial 
bakers, the potential influence of financial groups could be considerable.  
The problems described in points 2 and 3 are outside the scope of this 
paper, as here we focus only on what happens to the value of company 
shares on the stock market. In relation to information such as that on events 
in the derivatives market, the media, in reporting these events, are considered 
to play an ideological role. They reinforce the prevalent discourses that 
legitimize the models of financial policy, regulation, new investment 
technologies, financial instruments and specific commercial practices. 
Price movements tend to be reported in the media as external events 
that are attributable to the “markets”, as if they were an impersonal force of 
nature. The media naturalize the values as facts from a supposed objective 
market, whilst the processes that sustain the prices become opaque and 
mysterious. Once this cycle has begun, the media “noise” may create 
opportunities for speculation, as noise and rumors can move prices. As 
Thomson states (2009, p. 86), the impact of financial information is not a 
function of its accuracy or reliability, but a question of whether investors 
consider it to be relevant to their trading decisions.  
As we have seen in Davis, analysts can also be conditioned. Therefore, 
the system of filters described in the PM model exists, at least partially.  
 





In terms of financial information satisfying the interests of the elite, the 
filters vary depending on whether they deal with the state, the industrial 
sectors or the financial sector. For example, in the 2008 crisis and previous 
bubble, the financial press  was not critical with the financial sector or the 
capitalist system (Thompson 2009). 
The financial media play a potentially important role in the creation of a 
climate of investor expectations, perceptions and market sentiment. However, 
according to Thompson, the recognition of these processes complicates the 
conception of representation and filtering that is implicit in the PM. Therefore, 
despite its importance as an analytical tool, the PM model does not fully 
represent the complexity of the way economic information functions.  
Surprisingly, at  one end of the ideological spectrum  of Chomsky, the 
most neoliberal economists have also turned to political  analysis. Alexander 
Dyck and Luigi Zingales (2002) (2003) are proof of this fact. They considered 
that the incentive system is insufficient to ensure that the media report 
adequately on corporate governance. On the basis of this concept, Dyck, 
Zingales and Moss (2008) identified the asymmetric information as the source 
of the problem, and focused on muckraking6 and politics. Voter theory and, in 
general, public finance  and public choice theory, when well provided of good 
analytical tools for problems of collective choice, may also be applicable to 
considerations of the media as a sector in which, as in politics, collective 
consumption occurs. The media can contribute to reducei the problem of the 
regulators capture by companies in regulated sectors. However, it is not clear 
whether news corporations can  at the same time become captives of the 
interests of the regulated sectors.  
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) carried out an economic analysis of 
media bias caused by reputation with a very marked focus on politics. They 
concluded that competition between news corporations can reduce bias. 
However, if we consider all of the stakeholders  conditioning the news 
corporations, we can see that the sector is so complex that the economic 
analysis of these authors is not always evident.  
At the other end of the ideological spectrum, political and sociological 
trends oversimplify the issue. 
 
                                                
6 Journalistic research to expose bad practice in public life. 






Results of the analysis  
 
On the basis of papers by authors such as R. Shiller, A. Davis and 
Perramon (2009 and 2011, a, b, c), we have presented arguments and 
evidence that the financial press does influence economic bubbles. We have 
demonstrated that this influence is such that it drives both stock market 
investors’ demand for information and the supply of financial information.  
The fact that certain markets are characterized by asymmetric 
information affects the news that is offered. In contrast, when we review the 
hypothesis of the rationality of financial agents, considerations that affect the 
demand for information in particular emerge.  
Information is needed to evaluate companies by estimating their future 
returns. Nevertheless, this brings us up against an uncertainty problem that 
frequently cannot be resolved, as estimations depend not only on the most 
likely forecasts, which may be made on the basis of very weak knowledge of 
future factors, but also on the confidence with which they were made.7 In 
these circumstances, the problem is not that the investor does not want or 
have to be rational; it is that rationality simply cannot be attained8. 
However, the unsolvable problem of uncertainty can be approached in 
various ways. The correct way is by devoting time and effort to gain 
knowledge of the investment under analysis. Investors such as Warren Buffet 
follow this path9. The incorrect way is to use the shortcut of intuition. This 
attitude to uncertainty could be called “irrational” or herding10. 
One of the most trustworthy sources that the “irrational” investor uses is 
the state of public opinion¸ which is where the influence of the financial 
information published by the press becomes clear11.  
The main source of information on a listed company is the company 
itself. Increasingly, firms rely on specialized departments to communicate with 
shareholders and with the financial press in particular. Companies report to 
investment funds, which tend to be their main shareholders, to financial 
                                                
7  Perramon (2012) 
8  Perramon (2012) has formally defined the uncertainty problem faced by investors. 
9  Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 





analysts, and to the financial press. Some regulating organizations determine 
criteria for the information provided by companies12. 
The financial press directly influences small shareholders. However, 
major shareholders or investment funds are also interested in finding out 
whether the state of public opinion is favorable, as a company’s media image 
reflects general expectations and can also sometimes help to trigger a 
decision.  
Information on the economic and financial development of a company 
is only one part of the policy and strategy of business communication. 
Companies have to respond to the concerns of the stakeholders or interest 
groups (suppliers, consumers, employees, shareholders, financial institutions, 
government and the media), not just those of the shareholders.  
Companies’ efforts to communicate with their stakeholders can take 
many forms, depending on the sector. Some companies focus more on their 
image for the client, others for the government, the media, etc. In fact, 
reputation is linked to the problem of asymmetric information that is a 
characteristic of certain markets. In general, a company’s reputation cannot 
be separated from specifically economic or financial aspects. 
Regulated sectors are a particularly relevant case in terms of financial 
information. In these sectors, a company’s economic development also 
depends on its ability to capture regulatory agencies. Regulatory capture is 
based precisely on the maintenance of asymmetric information between the 
regulator, the regulated company and the consumer.  
As expected, to achieve their objectives such, companies are active in 
lobbying in general, and particularly in providing information to the financial 
press. The reasons for this greater level of communication activity can be 
supported by statistical tests, including an analysis of the predominance in the 
general and financial press of the IBEX 35 and Dow Jones companies13, and 
an analysis of the financial newspaper with the biggest circulation.  
In general, the financial press is biased towards information about the 
major companies that take up most of the financial news. However, the 
financial press has the greatest direct influence on investors and/or financial 
                                                
12 In Spain, this is called the National Securities Market Commission (Comissió Nacional del Mercat de Valors, 
CNMV). 
13  *** 






analysts when it reports on small companies for which little information is 
available.  
Another problem is journalists’ inevitable lack of independence with 
respect to information sources, which ends up creating a feedback loop. 
Journalists obtain most of their information from analysts’ reports, from 
corporate communication departments and from investment funds.  At the 
same time, analysts obtain their professional information from the financial 
media and institutional sources. Furthermore, analysts are probably not 
independent, as the entities to which they belong may have interests in the 
company under analysis. This is particularly likely if the entity is a bank. 
In the aforementioned system, there is an information feedback loop in 
which the market perception converges and can move the market, with no 
regard for quotations that are based on fundamental values. This contributes 
to bubbles and crashes14. 
R. Shiller15 agrees that, above all, the press and the financial media 
influence the formation of public opinions. Thus, they contribute to create the 
environment in which market events take place. Shiller also noted the key role 
of the feedback that occurs in speculative bubbles. He states that, as a result 
of having to offer topics that are of interest to the public, the media are key 
propagators of speculative share price movements.  
A consideration of sector biases supports these hypotheses, as the 
need for the media to provide interesting topics is fed by the continuous 
supply of information from these sectors.  
The Spanish financial and property bubble and subsequent crisis in 
2008 is a clear example of some sectors’ control of the information supply. In 
this bubble, the sensible, clear-sighted opinion of certain institutions and 
experts was silenced by the media noise, which was fed by the sectors that 




Barber, B. M. & Odean, T. (2007). All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the 
buying behavior of individual and institutional investors, The Review of Financial 
Studies, 21(2), 785-718. 
                                                
14 Thomson 
15 *** 





Brunnermeier, M. K. & Abreu, D. (2004). Bubbles and crashes, Econometrika, 71(1), 173-
204. 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2003). Information leakage and market efficiency, Princeton University 
Research Paper, June, available at www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/ 
information_leakage.pdf (accessed 30 july 2011). 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001). Asset pricing under asymmetric information. Bubles, Crashes, 
Technical Analysis, and Herding. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Cassidy, J. (2009). Porqué quiebran los mercados. La lógica de los desastres financieros. 
Trad. Efrén del Valle, Barcelona: RBA Libros. 
Chomsky, N. (2002). Media control: The spectacular achievements of propaganda. New York: 
Seven Stories Press. 
Davis, A. (2007). The economic inefficiencies of market liberalization, Global Media and 
Communication, 3(2), 157–78. 
Davis, A. (2006). Media effects and the question of the rational audience: lessons from the 
financial markets, Media Culture, 28(4), 603-625. 
Davis, A. (2006). The role of mass media in investor relations, Journal of Communication 
Manegement, 10(1), 7-17. 
Deephouse, D. L. (2000). Media reputation as a strategic resource: an integration of mass 
communication and resource-based theories, Journal of Management, 26(6), 1091-
1112. 
Deephouse, D. L. (1997). The effect of financial and media reputations on performance, 
Corporate Reputation Review, 1(1), 68-72. 
Dyck, A., Moss, D. & Zingales, L. (2008). Media versus special interests, NBER (National 
Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper, No. 14360, 1-47. 
Dyck, A. & Zingales, L. (2003). Media and asset prices, Harvard Business School Working 
Paper Series, No 04-003, 1-43. 
Dyck, A. & Zingales, L. (2002). The bubble and the media. In Cornelius, P. & B. Kogut (eds.), 
Corporate governance and capital flows in a global economy, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Galbraith, J. K. (1990). Breve historia de la euforia financiera. Trad. Vicente Villacampa, 
Barcelona: Ed. Ariel. 
Galbraith, J. K. (1956). El crac del 29. Trad J. Ferrer Aleu, Barcelona: Ed. Ariel. 
Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. (2006). Media bias and reputation, Journal of Political Economy, 
114(2), 280-316. 
Helm, S. (2007). The role of corporate reputation in determining investor satisfaction and 
loyalty, Corporate Reputation Review, 10(1), 22-37. 
Herman, E. S. (2000).The propaganda model: a retrospective, Journalism Studies, 1(1), 101–
12. 
Inoue, K. (2009). The role of communication in investor relation practices, 経営論集 第74号
（2009年11月). 
Kindleberger, C. P. (1978). Manias, panics, and crashes: A history of financial crises. New 
York: Basic Books. 






Milgrom, P. (2008). What the seller won’t tell you: Persuasion and disclosure markets, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 115-131. 
Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications, 
The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380-391. 
Perramon, J. (2012). Bombolles financeres I confusió informative. Relació entre la informació 
económica als Mitjans de comunicació i la presa de decisions d’inversió, Pròleg de 
Jordi Goula i Epíleg a càrrec d’Iu Pijoan. Ed. Kit Book. Dipòsit Digital de la UB. 
Schuster, T. (2003). Fifty-fifty. Stock recommendations and stock prices. Effects and benefits 
of investment advice in the business media,  Institute for Communication & Media 
Research (Leipzig University), Working Paper No. 03-01, 1-36. 
Shiller, R. (2000). Exhuberancia irracional. Trad. Teresa Arijón. México, D. F: Editorial 
Oceano. 
Shleifer, A. & Mullainathan, S. (2005). The market for news, The American Economic Review, 
85(4),1031-1053.   
Srivastava, R. K., Crosby, J. R., McInish, T. H., Wood, R. A. & Capraro, A. J. (2000). The 
value of corporate reputation: Evidence from the equity markets, Corporate 
Reputation Review, 1(1), 62-68. 
Thompson, P. A. (2009). Market manipulation? Applying the propaganda model to financial 
media reporting, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 6(2). 73-96. 
 
